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The University of Edinburgh
ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the retort ‘easy for you to say’ is a complaint about the target’s
standing, but that it invokes a standing norm that is unjustified. Moreover, I argue that
in many cases the person for whom it is ‘easy to say’ should speak.
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She made the cleverest people quite ashamed,
And even the good with inward envy groan,
Finding themselves so very much exceeded,
In their own way by all the things that she did.
Lord Byron, Don Juan, Canto I
1. Introduction
Zadie Smith, brilliant and successful author, is by society’s standards beautiful. Speak-
ing at the 2017 Edinburgh International Literary Festival, Smith told her audience that
she had recently instituted a new house rule. Smith noticed that her daughter, age
seven, was spending more and more time in getting ready before leaving the house
—not time in reading or drawing or playing games—but time in front of the mirror
and fussing over clothes. This upset Smith. It especially upset her when she compared
her daughter’s routine to her son’s. Her son was ready in minutes and seemed to give
little thought to his appearance. She pointed this out to her daughter: ‘I explained it to
her in these terms: you are wasting time, your brother is not going to waste any time
doing this,’ Smith said. ‘Every day of his life he will put a shirt on, he’s out the door and
he doesn’t give a shit if you waste an hour and a half doing your make-up’ [Branch
2017]. Fed up, she established the new rule. Everyone gets 15 minutes to get ready.
No more. What Smith said after she finished her story is contested. But what does
seem to be generally agreed is that Smith made critical remarks about make-up and
the influence that make-up and the beauty industry have on young girls and women.
Her comments, whatever their exact wording, did not go unnoticed. Smith received
many criticisms—criticism from left-leaning and feminist-friendly commentators and
venues like Jezebel and Bustle, and on the Twittersphere, more generally [Borovic 2017;
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Rebolini 2017]. There wasn’t a universal story of backlash and upset. Many of the com-
ments, however, fixated on Smith’s traditional beauty and went something like this:
‘Zadie Smith, you are a conventionally beautiful woman. You don’t get what it is
like for us women who don’t fit society’s beauty norms. You don’t ‘need’ make-up
to fit the mould.’ In other words, ‘Easy for you to say, Zadie Smith.’
Notice that these sorts of replies are not directed at the substance of what Smith
said.1 Rather they target Smith as the person who said what she said. Not that it
shouldn’t have been said; rather, it’s that she should not have been the one to say it.
This negative reaction to Smith gives the clear impression of being a criticism about
standing. Her critics seem to be making an objection to her in the following form:
the particular thing that you want to say or have said is easy for you to say, and
thus you cannot say it.
At first gleaning, ‘easy for you to say’ seems to mean that the target of the criticism
makes no sacrifice in following their own advice. It is easy for them to say, because it
costs them nothing to behave in the way that they have desiderated. The critics are
implying that this easiness disqualifies Smith from commenting. But I will argue
that the easy norm is not a justified standing norm.2 Moreover, I will argue that,
regardless of whether I’m right about this, the fact that something is easy for one to
say is actually a reason for them to say it. If, contrary to my argument, the easy
norm is a justified standing norm, it follows that easiness both disqualifies someone
from speaking and at the same time provides a reason for them to speak.
2. Moral Discourse and Standing
Families, partners, friends, colleagues, communities, and nations need to be able to com-
municate effectively about matters of moral importance. This is necessary for any possi-
bility of peace, harmony, and justice. But moral discourse can be difficult to do correctly.
And we need to be attentive to the particular ways that moral discourse can go wrong. It
can go wrong because we do not have the facts right, because we lie or deliberately
mislead each other, because we grandstand,3 because we are mean, because we are
petty, because we are arrogant, and so on. Moral discourse can also, arguably, go
awry because the wrong people are speaking on a particular moral question. Often,
worries about the wrong people talking are fleshed out in academic discourse as ques-
tions about standing. G.A. Cohen famously asked, ‘Who can condemn the terrorists?’
[2006]. This paper participates in that tradition of thinking about questions of standing
and norms of moral discourse. Other authors have examined the standing of the hypo-
crite and the meddler, among others, and many (although not all) have found those
persons to lack standing.4 Here I look at the standing of a new speaker, the ‘easy’ speaker.
1 Some of the other criticisms were directed at the substance: some thought that Smith failed to appreciate the
artistic talent required and others thought that she ignored its therapeutic benefits. Importantly, these types of
replies reject blameworthiness, and so deny that anyone, not just Smith, can blame make-up users.
2 To be clear, I am not interested in defending Smith full stop or the entirety of her remarks. My argument is not
intended to show that she had standing. Rather, it aims to show only that Smith didn’t lose standing in virtue of
her ease in speaking.
3 On grandstanding, see Tosi and Warmke [2016].
4 For literature that focuses on what the hypocrite and/or meddler does wrong, see Cohen [2006], Wallace
[2010], Herstein [2017], Isserow and Klein [2017], Fritz and Miller [2018], Edwards [2019], and Todd [2019]. Con-
versely, Bell [2013] argues that neither the hypocrite nor the meddler loses standing. Similarly, Dover [2019]
argues that those who fail to practice what they preach should not lose standing to engage in moral criticism.
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Questions about standing are, roughly, about which persons stand in the correct
position to perform some act or make some judgment of another’s action. Such ques-
tions arise in law, in philosophy, and in everyday situations. The law asks: who has the
standing to bring a constitutional challenge? Moral philosophers ask: who is in a pos-
ition to blame or forgive? A person may reply to their judgmental friend: ‘Look who’s
talking. Are you really in any position to criticize me?’ These issues of standing are sep-
arate questions from that of whether the challenge has merit, that of whether the action
is blameworthy or forgivable, or that of whether the friend’s criticism is valid. Ques-
tions about standing are not concerned directly with such matters; their direct
concern is with the speaker’s right to speak to such matters. The point of questions
about standing is that not just anyone can bring the claim, or blame, or forgive, or cri-
ticize. This paper is focused on standing to blame and criticize. When criticisms of
standing are levelled at someone who blames or criticizes, these are not ways of reject-
ing blameworthiness; rather, they are attempts to reject the blamer as the one who gets
to do the blaming or criticizing.
There are various approaches to standing. One view is that those without standing
lack the right or entitlement to speak (for instance, Todd [2019]). Call this the entitle-
ment view. Another view claims that those without standing fail to perform the rel-
evant speech act that they intend.5 Call this the failure view. Consider the example
of a hypocritical would-be blamer. The entitlement view says that she’s not entitled
to blame. The failure view says that she doesn’t actually blame. It does not matter,
for present purposes, which view of standing is correct. The entitlement view of stand-
ing is preferably simpler, and the paper proceeds as though that view is correct. All that
is said here, however, should apply equally to the failure view. It is worth pointing out
that I am interested in a rather everyday sense of standing—the sense expressed when
the public or ‘an average Jane’ thinks that person x shouldn’t be the one talking. The
everyday sense of standing has more affinity with the entitlement view. You don’t have
the right to talk to me about that.
3. What’s Easy?
This section has two main goals: (1) explain in what sense it is easy for the easy speaker
to say whatever they are going to say; and (2) show that the easy norm can’t be justified
because (a) it cannot be assimilated to already-theorized norms, and hence cannot
inherit whatever justification they have; and (b) two prominent and promising strat-
egies for justifying other standing norms do not justify the easy norm as a sui
generis standing norm.
Turning to the first task, a promising intuitive hypothesis is that, by ‘easy for you to
say’, we mean that it’s easy to say because whether the relevant norm is embraced or
rejected has little or no direct (negative) consequences for the speaker. To see this, let’s
look to the Titans volleyball team.6
In volleyball, height is an advantage. On a competitive volleyball team, most players
will be taller than the average person. Imagine that the Titans volleyball team is looking
for a quick way to make cuts after the first try-out. They use this criterion: if a player
5 See Cohen [2006] (but he also talks in entitlement terms) and Isserow and Klein [2017].
6 The volleyball example is less complicated than the Smith case, because structures of dominance and oppres-
sion are assumed not to exist.
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cannot jump and touch their forearm to the top of the net’s tape, they do not make it to
the next round of try-outs. For brevity, let’s call this the vertical rule.
The height culture is especially strong on the Titans team. The team is one in which
tall players are actively preferred to the detriment of shorter players and of the team
overall. There is a sense among some of the players that the vertical rule is not the
best rule for the team and that the Titans should abandon the rule. Are either the
tall players or the short players disqualified from saying it because of their relative
ease or difficulty in saying it? Who has the standing to voice this new way forward
for the team?
At first blush, there are at least two sorts of players that could advocate the rejection
of the vertical rule—tall players or short players. And there are a few different ways in
which we might understand the ease or difficulty with respect to voicing rejection of
the vertical rule. The acceptance and use of the rule are easy, in some sense, for tall
players to endorse. They are more likely to be able to touch the top of the net, and
so it is easy for them to endorse the rule because it works to their benefit. It is not
easy for a short person to endorse the vertical rule, because that rule makes it
harder for them to make the team. But it is also not easy for them to openly oppose
it: they may be accused of sour grapes.
On the other hand, the tall players won’t be accused of being self-interested if they
oppose the vertical rule, and their privilege generally on the team makes it easier for
them to speak (and to be heard). But rejecting the rule might be difficult for tall
players, because they might lose some of the advantage that they get from being tall.
Their desire to remain on the team might make it more difficult to speak up, even if
they actually endorse the new norm. This sense of ‘easy’ tracks the consequences of
openly expressing one’s opposition. But I don’t think that this is the sense of ‘easy’
that we mean to express when we level the ‘easy’ criticism.
To see this more clearly, let’s consider a different player, the one for whom it is easy
in the particular sense of ‘easy’ that is our focus. This is the star player, the player who
will clearly make the team if the athletes are assessed on the vertical rule, height,
serving percentage, points scored, and so on. Let’s call her Marianne. MVP of the
Titans, she speaks up, saying to her coaches and fellow teammates ‘We should get
rid of the vertical rule’, and she is critical of those players reluctant to embrace the
change. We can easily imagine some of the tall players, perhaps those anxious about
their ability to make the team if the vertical rule is nixed, criticizing Marianne with
the ‘easy’ charge. And it is easy for her, not because abandoning the vertical rule
benefits her, but because she will make the team no matter what. Marianne is the
one for whom it is easiest to speak for the new norm—primarily because her undeni-
able volleyball skills protect her from being cut from the team (she doesn’t need a try-
out rule that stacks the deck in her favour). That means that it does not matter for Mar-
ianne’s spot on the team whether or not the vertical norm is rejected. And this is the
sense of ‘easiness’ that I think we mean to track with the ‘easy’ retort—namely, that the
consequences of the norm don’t affect the person who is speaking.
That takes us to this section’s second aim. Why might Marianne’s ease in speaking
out against the vertical norm disqualify her from doing so? It seems to be because the
consequences don’t affect her in the right way. She doesn’t have enough at stake. As
noted earlier, philosophers have already enumerated some standing criteria, arguing
that if one doesn’t meet them then one does not have standing. Perhaps the ‘easy’
standing complaint is best understood as a version of one of those, and thus can be
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justified via one of those norms. Philosophers suggest that someone may lose standing
to blame7 for these reasons: (1) one’s blame would be hypocritical; (2) one is involved
in the person’s wrongdoing; and (3) the person’s wrongdoing is none of one’s business.
At first glance, it seems that the ‘none of one’s business’ criterion is the closest to the
sentiment of the ‘easy’ charge. Marianne isn’t directly affected by the consequences of
the norm, because she will make the team no matter what, and so one might think that
it’s none of her business whether or not the Titans employ or reject the vertical rule.
But surely it is Marianne’s business what rules the team uses to cut players: after all, she
is on the team. The quality of the other players affects the team’s success and
Marianne’s ability to perform well. ‘Mind your own business’ might be an appropriate
reply to a busybody who is not on the team or even to a school donor who doesn’t
know anything about volleyball, but it seems a misguided thing to say to Marianne.
The business criterion is normally cashed out as a worry about the criticizer and the
criticized not being in the right sort of relationship with each other [Bell 2013;
Edwards 2019]. A meddler, by definition, does not have the right relationship to the
wrongdoer, and so does not have standing to blame, but Marianne clearly stands in
the right sort of relationship to her fellow teammates and coaches to be able to criticize
them on the subject of volleyball or on how the team is trained. In contrast, she might
not be in the right sort of relationship with her teammate to criticize that teammate’s
disrespect of their grandparent. So, the vertical rule is Marianne’s business, but never-
theless it is still too easy for her to say; or so the worry seems to go.
Is it hypocritical of Marianne to advocate the rejection of the vertical rule? What
exactly it is for someone to be hypocritical is tricky, but we tend to think that
someone is a hypocrite if they say one thing and do another—when there is this mis-
match. It is hard to see how its being easy for Marianne to speak for the new norm
could make her a hypocrite. She doesn’t say one thing (‘reject the rule’) and do
another (making it very hard for the try-out rules to be changed, for example). She
opposes the vertical rule and is a very good player. There is no mismatch. Does her
overwhelming volleyball skill make it hypocritical for her to have an opinion on the
criteria for making the team? I can’t see how. Now, it might be that in previous
seasons Marianne was a big proponent of the vertical rule because she was a less
talented player and needed the advantage. In that case, her sudden change of heart
seems fishy and evidence of a double standard. And so she might be a hypocrite,
but notice that we need to have that extra bit of information for the hypocrisy
charge to make sense. The ‘easy’ charge, on the other hand, makes sense without it.
So, Marianne, as initially described, is not a hypocrite.
Closely related to the non-hypocrisy norm is the non-complicity norm. Perhaps
Marianne was involved somehow in the acceptance of the vertical rule, and thus vio-
lates the non-complicity condition. Again, it is not clear how we could understand
Marianne’s ease in speaking out as incriminating her in being part of the problem
that she wanted to change. Does the mere fact that she is an exceptional volleyball
player make it the case that the team needed to use the vertical rule or was more
likely to use the vertical rule? I struggle to see a sensible way of cashing out the
‘easy’ charge as a way of pointing to Marianne’s own involvement with the vertical
norm such that she would be disqualified from speaking.
7 I am interested in more than just blame, but also criticism, advice, and so on. For a similarly broad discussion of
standing beyond blame, see Bell [2013], Herstein [2017], and Dover [2019].
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So, the ‘easy’ charge cannot straightforwardly be understood as being part of
an already-articulated standing criterion. We therefore cannot rely on those
norms for its justification. Moving to the second part of the second goal, I will
now argue that the most promising ways of justifying it as a sui generis standing
norm fail.
Here is one plausible way of understanding the rationale behind the ‘easy’ retort as a
sui generis norm: we can only be criticized by those who have experienced (or could
possibly experience) the same difficulties or who have been tempted by the same
course of action as has tempted us. If this is a standing criterion then Marianne
doesn’t have standing, because she isn’t tempted to endorse a potentially unfair try-
out rule, like the vertical one, because she doesn’t need to worry about having a rule
that will work to her advantage. And the ‘easy’ speaker, more generally, doesn’t
have standing, according to this criterion, because their ease is what eliminates their
potential to be tempted in the specific way at issue. Can such a standing norm be
justified? Or is the retort simply evidence of our tendency to dislike opprobrium
even when it’s deserved?
Let’s look at some generic strategies for justifying standing norms, and ask whether
any of them can be used to justify the ‘easy’ norm. Patrick Todd offers a unified
account of standing that argues that all persons who lack standing are those who
are not committed to their proclamations of practice. Todd [2019] contends, for
example, that the hypocrite’s failure to live up to their own standards demonstrates
that they aren’t properly committed to those standards, and that this is why hypocrites
don’t have standing. And so, on his picture, in order to have standing, one needs to
have sufficient commitment to what one is saying. Todd’s unified theory of standing
appeals to the value of commitment, but such a theory does not justify the easy
norm. That’s because its being easy for someone to say doesn’t track their commitment
in the same way as continued failure to live up to one’s preached norms does. Indeed,
in speaking out against a norm, the easy speaker demonstrates their commitment.
That’s why silence is often understood as complicity. The easy speaker is committed
to what she says. So, Todd’s theory does not justify the easy norm. In fact, his view,
if correct, provides reason to think the standing norm is not justified. That’s
because Todd’s theory explains the unity of the family of justified standing norms;
but it does not apply to the easy norm. So, it provides us with reason to think that
the easy norm does not belong to that family—in other words, that the easy norm is
not a justified standing norm.
Other justifications of standing criteria are based on concerns for equality. For
example, Wallace [2010] argues that the hypocrite doesn’t have standing to blame,
because they countenance their own moral failings but chastise others for theirs. In
doing so, according to Wallace, the hypocrite denies the equal standing of persons
—a fundamental moral principle. But one’s ease in speaking doesn’t imply a denial
of the equality of persons. The easy speaker doesn’t violate principles related to equal-
ity, simply in virtue of their ease in speaking.
I’ve considered two promising generic strategies for justifying standing norms, and
argued that neither justifies the easy norm (understood as a sui generis standing norm).
I’ve also considered whether the easy norm can be translated into the already articu-
lated norms, and thereby inherit their justification. I have, however, demonstrated
that it cannot. This does not deductively entail that the easy norm lacks justification.
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But it creates a presumption in favour of that conclusion. The burden is now on my
opponent to produce a justification.8
4. Return to Smith
I’ve argued that the easy norm is not a justified standing norm. I will now argue that,
regardless of whether I’m right about that, the fact that something is easy for one to say
is actually a reason for them to say it. If, contrary to what I’ve argued, the easy norm is a
justified standing norm, it follows that such easiness both disqualifies someone from
speaking (because they lack standing) and at the same time provides a reason for
them to speak.
Let us reacquaint ourselves with the example: Smith is a conventionally attractive
woman advocating that women reject beauty norms. Like being tall in volleyball,
being a conventionally attractive woman brings with it many advantages. Women,
in particular, seemingly cannot avoid having their looks be part of their capital. More-
over, advocating the rejection of beauty norms is a rebellious claim in our society. So,
of whom is Zadie Smith the analogue? Is she the tall player, the short player, or Mar-
ianne, the superstar? Remember that the superstar is the player who will make the
team, no matter what. Tall players lose whatever advantage they had in virtue of
their height if the vertical rule is abandoned. With that in mind, you might think
that Smith is the tall player (she is clearly not the short player). After all, she
benefits from a world that gives advantages to those who are beautiful, and she
would lose such an advantage in a world that didn’t. But this is too quick, and is
one of the instances in which the volleyball example and the real-world examples
come apart. If the Titans reform their try-out criteria and drop the vertical rule,
then as soon as they do it the tall players lose their advantage with respect to
making the team. It is a rule that can be switched off or on, although there might be
a lingering prejudice. Beauty norms are not like that. There is no rule that we can
switch off and on. Progress, if we are to have any, will be slow. Thus, Smith is actually
more like the superstar player: when she doesn’t use make-up, she still is convention-
ally attractive. She makes the beautiful team, no matter what. It is easy for Smith to tell
women to reject make-up, because she remains conventionally beautiful even without
it: in other words, her rejection seemingly carries no costs for her at all. Indeed, this
seems to have been part of the criticism levelled at her: easy for you to say, because
you don’t need make-up. So, Smith can easily reject it herself and call on us to do like-
wise. And, like Marianne, I think that she is in a good position, because of the easiness,
to advocate against oppressive beauty ideals. Beauty norms should change, and Smith
is doing her part (or at the very least she is doing something) to change them. Admit-
tedly, she isn’t going out of her way to be ‘hideous’ (as a way to undercut beauty norms
and to normalize deviations from the ideal and variations in expression of appearance),
but I am not sure that she is required to do so.9
I cannot see a plausible explanation why Smith should be barred from advocating
the new norm just because it is easy for her to do so. So, while the ‘easy’ retort is
8 Most of the standing criteria point to a wrong in the would-be blamer’s moral record in making their case for
lost standing. But the easy speaker’s moral record is clean. This also lends support to my claim.
9 Kathryn Pauly Morgan [1991] suggests that we should only use cosmetic surgery to make our noses bigger, our
thighs fatter, and so on.
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levelled in an attempt to take away standing, it fails to provide legitimate grounds for
loss of standing. And thus it should not persuade an audience or hearer to ignore a
speaker. In fact, because the easy speaker faces no costs, I actually think that she
should say it.10 That is, not only does she have standing to say it, but she seems, prac-
tically speaking, in a particularly good position to advocate the new norm. To put the
point another way, if Smith remained silent then we could criticize her with ‘but it’s
easy for you to say. And so you should say it!’ (This is obviously a sense different
from the way that it was actually used against Smith.) I suggested earlier that easiness
can track the consequences of whether the norm is adopted/rejected, and also track
easiness about the expression of one’s endorsement—about the reaction of others to
one’s words, irrespective of whether the norm is adopted/rejected. While these are dis-
tinct types of easiness, in speaking they will often coincide. If the stakes for you per-
sonally are low with respect to the rejection or acceptance of a specific norm, it is
likely that you have a privileged voice more generally, just as Smith does.11 Her con-
ventional beauty benefits her, and allows her to be heard more readily.
Notice that this analysis fits with how we tend to think about who should do what,
given the respective costs. That is, if it is easier for Dorothy to do the right thing and
more difficult for Rose, the relative ease speaks in favour of Dorothy doing it. And the
difficulty makes Rose’s inaction understandable, perhaps justified or excused. Consider
the #metoo campaign. Its recent viral iteration was at first mainly participated in by
famous wealthy women who were in a stronger position to deal with the public scru-
tiny than are many other women who face sexual harassment and abuse.12 I point this
out, not to underestimate either the cost for those women participating in the cam-
paign or their courage, but rather to highlight that the women who have been most
willing and able to come forward are those women who were already in significant pos-
itions of power. Such women face the lowest risk of stigmatization and censure, and
have more resources to deal with stigmatization and censure, should it occur. It is
easier for them to say it, and so, in some senses, we expect them to say it (including,
in some respect, to say it for others for whom it is not so easy).13
5. An Epistemic Claim
A possible objection to what I have argued thus far is that I’ve mischaracterized the
thrust of the easy complaint by interpreting it as one about standing. One might
contend that it’s more about the substance of what was said. So, instead of being a com-
plaint that rejects a particular blamer, it is actually a way of rejecting blameworthiness
or the criticism altogether. For the Smith case, that would mean something like ‘the use
of make-up isn’t that bad’, or, for the Marianne case, something like ‘we don’t need to
change the vertical rule.’
The ‘easy’ retort might be a shorthand way to make an epistemic claim. On this
picture, when someone uses the ‘easy’ reply, they’re worried that the person in question
has not done the calculations correctly or does not have access to all of the information
10 This suggests that if, despite arguments here, the easy norm could be justified, then it might be the case that,
all things considered, the easy speaker should speak, despite not having standing. And she should do so because
it is easy for her.
11 The easy speaker also will not be accused of being purely self-interested.
12 Here I draw on ongoing work and discussions with Alexandra Whelan on privacy.
13 Expectation might not be exactly the right sentiment, but something more than hope is.
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relevant for making such a claim. So, in the case of Zadie Smith, it might mean some-
thing like this:
Smith, you are a beautiful woman by standard beauty norms. Because of that, you don’t know
or fully appreciate all of the important and relevant costs that burden women who do not meet
these norms. This means that, in doing the mathematics about whether women as a class
should use make-up, you’re more likely to have made a calculation mistake.14 Thus, your criti-
cism is mistaken.
This suggestion of miscalculation could be what the ‘easy’ remark is getting at. But
there are a few reasons for thinking that isn’t right. One reason is that I take it that
many of Smith’s critics are actually sympathetic with Smith’s general contention and
her worries about beauty norms and how they’re oppressively applied to women.
Lumping feminists together, I think that most would agree that how such norms
play out in our world is bad and that it is especially bad for women. It is not just
that they want to smash the patriarchy as much as Smith does; it is that they also
agree with her specific tactics for smashing it. So, the critics’ issue is not with
Smith’s mathematics. My second reason lies in the actual words that constitute the
remark: easy for you to say. Not: what you say is wrong, or what you say is too
quick, or a variation of that. I am not intending to put too much emphasis on the
specific words, but I want to point out that we do have other retorts at the ready
when we disagree with the substance of our opponents’ claims. Furthermore, I
suspect that, even if the audience knew that Smith had all of the information and
had done the mathematics correctly, she still would have been met with the ‘easy’ criti-
cism. Consider an eavesdropper who only overhears Smith’s comments but doesn’t
know anything about Smith (doesn’t know that she is attractive, successful, and so
on).15 Upon hearing Smith’s critique, the eavesdropper might think about whether
her claims have merit or not, but because they don’t know anything about Smith
they won’t say or think to themselves ‘easy for you to say.’ Just as they won’t say
‘she’s such a hypocrite’, since they don’t know who the speaker is. Thus, the ‘easy’
retort is about the speaker and their standing.
There is another version of epistemic complaint that aims not at Smith’s mathemat-
ics, but rather at whether she is a reliable calculator.16 That is, the easy complaint might
mean that Smith is unreliable on the issue at hand (she may have reached the right
answer, by luck or fluke). But, again, I don’t think that this quite captures the easy com-
plaint. Imagine that Smith had her doctorate in gender studies and was the expert on
the effects on women of the beauty industry—and, what’s more, that she understood,
although perhaps would not fully experience herself, the costs of rejecting make-up. In
this case we make her reliable, and so this epistemic version of the complaint doesn’t
make sense here; however, the standing complaint would.
In criticizing the epistemic interpretation of the ‘easy’ retort, I am not trying to
establish that that interpretation is never what is going on when the ‘easy’ retort is
levelled.17 My aim is more modest. I intend to show that there are at least some
cases where an epistemic interpretation isn’t going to capture the whole picture.
14 This is similar to claims in standpoint epistemology.
15 Thanks to Guy Fletcher for this example.
16 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this version of the epistemic complaint.
17 Nor am I claiming that they are always entirely distinct. Some of our standing norms might be related to epis-
temic norms—for example, standing to do with expertise.
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Seeing the ‘easy’ retort as one about standing is, I submit, familiar: the sentiment it
expresses is one that we recognise and probably have felt.
6. What the ‘Easy’ Complaint Gets Right
So far, it seems that ‘easy for you to say’ is an empty accusation. But it is in thinking
about the Smith example and other real-world examples that we find the kernel of
something valuable to the ‘easy’ charge—namely, that ‘it’s easy for you to say’
means that there is (probably) a better person to say it,18 a person whose saying it is
more meaningful. If we consider an example, we can get close to what I mean by
‘more meaningful’. It is a sense that is familiar in our everyday lives. Imagine two
friends, Seamus and Eden, who have a nasty fight. As a result, Seamus disinvites
Eden to his thirtieth-birthday party. Nadia is good friends with both, and often
plays peacekeeper when they fight. After some time has passed and tempers have
cooled, Nadia helps Seamus to see that it was rash to un-invite Eden and that
Seamus will regret it if Eden isn’t at his party. Because Eden and Seamus haven’t yet
made-up, Seamus asks Nadia to let Eden know that he is invited and that Seamus
wants him to be there. Even though Eden knows that Nadia often plays the go-
between, and that Seamus wouldn’t tell Nadia to pass on the re-invitation unless he
really meant it, the re-invitation nevertheless would be more meaningful if it were
to come from Seamus himself. It is this sense of ‘meaningful’ that I have in mind.
Who the speaker is adds a little heft to what is being said. That is why it is better
that the person who struggles under the norm speaks out against it. But that there is
a better person to say it does not mean that you shouldn’t say it, especially if we
risk no one saying it. The invitation that comes from Seamus is more meaningful,
but if he won’t (because at present he’s not ready to communicate with Eden directly)
then it is still preferable that Nadia passes it along (rather than having no one say it).
Returning to the Smith example, if part of what the ‘easy’ retort is getting at is that
there are women for whom it is not so easy to reject make-up, I agree. I agree also
that in some sense it would be better if those were the women criticizing and rejecting
beauty norms. And I think that it would be better because it would be more meaning-
ful, in the sense articulated just now. They are especially marginalized under compul-
sory beauty norms, and ignored if they speak up about most things. So, it is rebellious
in many ways just for that person to demand to be heard and to speak on the issue.
That rebellion itself challenges the status quo surrounding beauty norms, in addition
to the actual content of what they are saying.
7. Who Should Say It?
There is no ideal person to criticize the beauty industry.19 Although I think that it is
more meaningful if someone who is considered unattractive speaks out against
beauty norms, I understand why they might not: instead of various media outlets
crying out that they are too beautiful to ‘get’ make-up, people would probably
18 Better, at least according to one measure. It might also be more effective to have those who struggle under
the norm speak out against it, but then again those with more privilege might be heard more.
19 This discussion highlights a general tension between (i) standing norms on blame and (ii) the point of blame.
See also Bell [2013], who argues that the aims of blame can be achieved by those commonly thought not to have
standing.
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humiliate and ridicule these women, accusing them of just not liking make-up because
even those enhancements can’t make them pretty.20 Smith’s fate doesn’t seem so bad
when compared to that. Smith, as a conventionally beautiful woman, is someone who
can and should speak out. It is much riskier for non-conventionally-attractive women
to push us to reject beauty norms, because they lack the privilege that accompanies
beauty; but, as with the #metoo movement, Smith’s actions might inspire others,
including some who are less privileged.
In an illuminating contrast to Smith, consider Roxane Gay and what is easy for her
to say. Gay, a writer, academic, and self-professed bad feminist,21 is a fat woman.22 She
thinks that our world is cruel to, and unwelcoming of, her body and bodies like hers.
She argues that this must change: she knows that people ought to be able to move about
the world, literally and metaphorically, in a way that does not punish them for their
size. And she is adamant that being loved by oneself and others should not, and
does not, require thinness. When Gay proclaims that everyone should love their
body, it is not easy for her to say.23 Hers is the body that society tells us we ought
to dislike, or to modify in an extreme makeover. Gay’s acceptance and love of her
body is rebellious. But it is a difficult stance for her to live by all of the time.
Indeed, Gay has said that she wants to lose weight.24 Because of this, she is accused
of being fat-phobic and a hypocrite. The threat of losing standing is always close by,
it seems.
The point to be taken from the Gay example is that it is always hard to say the rebel-
lious thing: it’s either too easy for you to say, or it’s hard and one misstep and suddenly
you’re a hypocrite. Given that it is a lose–lose situation, I’m inclined to think that the
person with more privilege (the Zadie Smiths of the world) should bear the burdens of
the ‘easy’ charge, should that come her way.
Perhaps those in a position to speak more ‘easily’ should voice their criticisms
differently than should those without as much privilege. In particular, perhaps they
should be forthcoming or candid about their own ease and privilege. Smith might
have been able to mitigate the ‘easy’ accusation by acknowledging that it is easy for
her to say. This strategy might be a more, or a less, successful tactic for mollifying
one’s potential critics, depending on what it is, exactly, to which one is admitting.
My guess is that it would not have been the best way for Smith to go. Imagine if
she’d said ‘I know that I am a beautiful woman, but our cultural obsession with wes-
ternized beauty norms and make-up is terrible.’25 Think of the further abuse to which
20 Consider what happened to Lindy West after she debated comedian Jim Norton about whether rape jokes
were out of line. After the debate aired, West received slews of online attacks (including rape and death
threats). As West wrote, ‘detractors have been threatening to rape and kill me, telling me I’m just bitter
because I’m too fat to get raped, and suggesting that the debate would have been better if it had just been
Jim raping me’ (my emphasis). See Travers [2013].
21 She considers herself a bad feminist because she falls short of her own feminist ideals. She might also be
accused of hypocrisy for this. See Gay [2014].
22 Gay self-describes as fat. I understand that the term is loaded, especially loaded when used to describe
women. I use it here, however, because I believe that the word is being reclaimed, much like the term ‘slut’.
It is not bad to be fat.
23 It is not easy for her to say, both because the voices of people who are fat are marginalized and ignored and
because the rejection of the ‘love every body’ norm has serious consequences for Gay. To be clear, I do not mean
to comment exactly on how Gay feels about her body currently or at any specific time.
24 See, for example, Gay [2017].
25 There might be other ways for her to be candid, such as ‘I know there is immense pressure on women to look a
certain way and that it will be more difficult for some women to resist those pressures.’ And perhaps that would
be heard more welcomingly, although critics could still reply ‘What do you know about how difficult it will be?’
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she would have opened herself—the accusations of vanity (a mortal sin for women
everywhere). Women have to be beautiful, and spend hundreds of dollars to do so,
but must not act like they actually care about being beautiful. No doubt, she would
have received a dissection of her looks, and a list of ‘reasons’ why she is actually not
beautiful and in fact needs a lot more make-up or retouching, and so on. On the
other hand, the employed friend who is giving advice about the job market to an
unemployed friend might do well to flag that it is easy for them to say that a good
job will arise.
We need to be careful about howwe treat and use criticisms that target people’s stand-
ing.26 Attacks on standing skirt the substance of the debate, which can seem like a benefit
to those wielding them, and to those who were the target of the original critique. I don’t
have to convince you, or others, that you’re wrong about the substance of your claim or
even directly engage with it. I can just point out that you aren’t allowed to speak on the
issue. It is much easier to call into question someone’s standing than it is to engage
with the issues and arguments in play. Critics of Smith who cast doubt on her standing
urge people, at least implicitly, to ignore what she says without discussing or speaking
to the important social issues that she has raised. Those critics don’t have to say anything
about the role that the beauty industry plays in the oppression of women, but nevertheless
they influence and shape debate about that very subject. This is worrying.
Philosophers and non-philosophers alike have endorsed the critique of standing as a
valid way of disarming opponents. Targeting standing can seem to be an attractive
strategy in areas of debate where there is deep and divisive disagreement.27 Where
debates have become particularly partisan, and people are entrenched in their respect-
ive views, it can seem futile to persist in attempts to convince the other side that their
position is wrong on its merits. The charge of easiness (and other standing complaints)
provides another ground for critique. In the everyday, we tend to think that those who
don’t have standing can be ignored. And if the opportunity presents itself, we often try
to induce others to ignore them as well. That is, we think that we don’t have to listen to,
or engage with, someone who lacks standing. And many philosophers theorizing about
standing have agreed with our everyday approach. They argue that the fact that a
person lacks standing changes the reply options available to a respondent. In this
vein, James Edwards [2019] argues that, where one person lacks standing, the object
of her criticism is not required to explain themselves or to respond to the substance
of the criticism other than by pointing out that the former lacks the standing to
blame them. Ori Herstein [2017] has argued that the respondent is entitled to
deflect some of the reasons offered by the person who lacks standing,28 and on
other views the respondent is entitled to dismiss the hypocritical blamer entirely. As
G.A. Cohen puts it, one way to silence our critics is to call into question their standing
to criticize [2006: 7]. We needn’t fixate on the details of these arguments. The point to
emphasize is that the stakes are high for the standing of the ‘easy’ speaker and for the
For a recent example of an attempt to be forthcoming about her own privilege backfiring, see Ahsan [2020].
Actor and activist, Jameela Jamil, was accused of ‘humble bragging’ after acknowledging that her wealth
allowed her access to better skincare, after people on social media praised her beautiful skin. The point is
that context will determine whether candour will be appreciated.
26 This discussion draws on O’Brien and Whelan [ms].
27 See Shklar [1984], Runciman [2008], Isserow and Klein [2017], and Dover [2019].
28 Herstein [2017] contends that, when someone lacks standing, their target has the option of dismissing the
‘directed-reasons’ offered.
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public discussion of major social issues. Importantly, such attacks aim to silence
without any engagement with the merits or demerits of the claim made. Most criti-
cisms that focus on standing deflect attention away (sometimes deliberately) from
serious and complex issues. Often, attacks on standing seem more focused on trivial
point-scoring rather than sincere engagement with challenging and pressing issues.
And they are convenient ways for wrongdoers to avoid having to answer for
themselves.
It might be that there are some speakers who do not have standing, like the meddler
or the hypocrite. But we need to be cautious about adding too hastily to the list of
standing criteria, in part because of what it means for the person who doesn’t have
standing and for our moral discourse. I’ve argued here that ‘non-easiness’ is not a
justified standing criterion. What does that mean about the fate of ‘easy for you to
say’? Should we endeavour to excise it from our arsenal of retorts? This is complicated.
The reply gets some things right—in particular, that there is a better speaker. And often
that is worth noting even if the better speaker won’t or can’t do the speaking, like less
conventionally attractive women who fear ridicule and cruelty if they talk publicly
about beauty. But the response gets some things wrong, too: it suggests that the
‘easy’ speaker shouldn’t be speaking. Often, however, they are the only ones who are
realistically in a good position to do the speaking. And if they don’t speak, issues of
injustice and wrongdoing might remain unaddressed.
8. Speaking for Others and Crowding Out
I have suggested that the Zadie Smiths of the world should speak up and advocate, and
criticize pervasive and pernicious norms even though (perhaps because) it’s easy for
them to do so. Part of my reasoning behind this is that someone should do the criticiz-
ing. A worry about this is that if we encourage the Smiths of the world to do all of the
speaking, their voices will crowd out those of the more marginalized, including some of
the voices that I’ve suggested would be better speakers. A stronger version of this worry
is that my argument licenses others speaking on behalf of those whom they should not
pretend to represent. My argument does not lead to either of these conclusions. Those
more privileged need to be attentive to the voices that are often less heard, and need to
listen for those voices and work to make room for them in the public square. All of
what I have said here is compatible with the value of representation and diversity of
voices. My arguments do not endorse condescension, preaching, or shaming; rather,
they endorse thoughtful consideration and reflection.
9. Conclusion
There is a growing body of literature on the standing of various speakers such as the
hypocrite and the meddler. This paper examined the standing of a new speaker, the
‘easy’ speaker. I argued that the retort ‘easy for you to say’ is a complaint about the
target’s standing, but that it invokes a standing norm that is unjustified. Moreover,
in many cases the person for whom it is easy to say should speak. I also emphasized
that the stakes for getting standing right are high: if one doesn’t have standing, one
can be dismissed and ignored, and criticisms of standing do not directly engage in
the substance of debate. Thus, I suggested that we should be cautious about how we
use and treat attacks on standing. I argued that the ‘easy’ criticism does not remove
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standing, but I also highlighted what the ‘easy’ criticism does get right—namely, that
there is a better speaker.29
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